




Productivity and the Investment Climate: What Matters Most? 
 




This paper explores the links between the investment climate and firm-level productivity 
and attempts to identify which dimensions of the investment climate matter most for 
productivity. The analysis is based on data collected in a recent Investment Climate 
survey of garment and food processing firms across five countries in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia. The paper uses the first principal components of a series of indicators to 
summarize broad aspects of the investment climate and identify those most important in 
determining productivity. The results indicate that competitive pressure is the most 
critical factor in the investment climate, accounting for more variation in firm-level 
productivity than infrastructure provision or issues related to government rent seeking 
and bureaucratic burden. This suggests that to improve productivity, increase output, and 
reduce poverty, policymakers should focus reform efforts on removing barriers to entry 
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Productivity growth is the sine qua non for economic growth and consequently poverty 
alleviation. While factor accumulation is important, increases in capital and labor inputs 
alone do not explain cross-country differences in growth. Economic research has shown 
that improvements in the efficiency with which countries use their inputs—their total 
factor productivity (TFP), —explains most of the increase in output for fast-growing 
economies. No country has experienced sustained economic growth without also 
achieving rapid gains in productivity. The questions then for policymakers are these: 
What determinants of productivity cause producers in one country to be more efficient 
than those in competitor countries? And where should reform efforts be targeted to have 
the greatest impact on productivity and thus poverty reduction?  
 
In a global economy where technology diffuses rapidly and capital is mobile, the 
persistence of productivity differences among countries can be largely explained by 
differences in the investment climate—the policy, institutional, and regulatory 
environment in which businesses must operate. Countries where property rights are 
secure, the government provides efficient services, and infrastructure is well developed 
are considered to have a good investment climate. And a good investment climate 
reduces the cost of doing business and leads to higher and more certain returns on 
investment.  
   
But merely knowing that the investment climate matters is not enough. Policymakers are 
constrained by limited resources, and the path of reform is difficult and often slow. While 
some policy reforms can be instituted relatively quickly, many changes—such as building   3
infrastructure and improving the quality of the workforce—take years. To be most 
effective, policymakers must be able to prioritize and direct their efforts to where they 
will have the largest and quickest impact.  
 
This paper directly links the investment climate to firm performance and identifies 
dimensions of the investment climate that account for cross-country differences in 
productivity. And it presents evidence that competitive pressure is the most important of 
these dimensions in determining productivity and thus the area where policymakers 
should first focus their reform efforts. In highly competitive and dynamic economies, 
inefficient firms are driven out and surviving businesses are forced to seek continuous 
improvement. This effect has been clearly illustrated in such countries as China and 
India, which have made enormous gains in productivity after liberalizing their markets 
and opening them to the world economy.  
 
Many studies have linked institutions and growth at the macroeconomic level (see Hall 
and Jones 1999). These studies rely on cross-country samples and use proxies at the 
country level for such factors as government efficiency, policy uncertainty, and the 
security of property rights. The investment climate approach, a closely related concept, 
strengthens the institutional literature by providing microeconomic foundations. This 
paper follows the lead of Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae (2003) in using data 
from recent World Bank Investment Climate Surveys (ICS) to directly link indicators of 
the investment climate to firm-level productivity. It uses data from a recently completed 
survey of five transition economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia to estimate total   4
factor productivity and econometrically demonstrate the impact of the investment climate 
on productivity.  
 
But this paper also goes a step further than previous earlier papers, and ranks the broad 
measures of the investment climate by their relative importance in explaining the 
variation in productivity across countries. This ranking technique can help policymakers 
use the results of the productivity analysis to design and implement policies for creating a 
pro-growth, and thus pro-poor, investment climate. 
 
The Data 
The data used for this study were drawn from an investment climate survey conducted by 
the World Bank in 2003 across five transition countries: the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, 
Poland, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The survey used an identical instrument in each 
country to conduct face-to-face interviews with firms’ managers and bookkeepers or 
accountants. The questionnaire was similar to that used in the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Productivity Survey conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and World Bank in 2002. But it was amended to collect accounting data 
needed to estimate TFP and to improve comparability with the World Bank’s core 
productivity and investment climate survey instrument. The survey, known as the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Productivity Extension Survey, was wide ranging: 
in addition to the accounting data, it sought both quantitative and qualitative information 
on investment climate indicators, including managers’ perceptions of the business 
environment.    5
 
The survey was conducted simultaneously across all five countries, making a useful 
point-in-time comparison.
1 In each country a sample of 100 enterprises was drawn 
randomly from all size categories, with the sample equally split between enterprises 
whose main operations were in the garment sector and those whose main operations were 
in food processing. As far as was possible, the food processing sample was drawn from 
firms classified under NACE code 15.1 (production and preserving of meat and meat 
products).  
 
Restricting the sample to two sectors helped ensure the accuracy of the productivity 
estimation. Both sectors produce tradable goods in reasonably competitive markets. 
Firms in the sample were therefore likely to face common prices, reducing the chance 
that the nominal value of output (and thus productivity) was inflated because of market 
power. Since the sectors are narrowly focused, it is also likely that the selected firms  
were using similar technologies. This leads to a more homogeneous production function 
and makes it easier to attribute the residual to differences in efficiency rather than 
differences in technology or market structure.  
 
Although over 500 firms were surveyed, many did not report the full range of investment 
climate measures needed for the study. Others were engaged only in part in garment 
production or food processing, deriving the rest of their earnings from services, trading, 
                                                 
1 The survey was administered and supervised in all five countries by a single firm, and the enumerators 
underwent training together to reduce variation among countries due to differences in implementation 
methodologies. Because of worries about survey fatigue following the large Business Environment and 
Enterprise Productivity Survey less than a year earlier, the sample was limited to 100 firms in each country.   6
or other types of activities. Still others reported numbers that were not credible, 
particularly in response to questions on firm performance and labor inputs. Once outliers, 
incomplete observations and observations on firms that were not solely manufacturers 
were removed, 362 observations remained—192 in food processing and 170 in garments 
(see appendix tables A1.1 and A1.2 for descriptive statistics).  
 
Transition and the Investment Climate 
The five transition countries in the sample provide a unique opportunity to explore the 
impact of the investment climate and liberalization efforts. At independence all five 
countries inherited centrally planned economies with heavily distorted markets. But their 
response to this situation varied. 
 
Poland moved aggressively to liberalize and institute market reforms. It rapidly 
transferred productive assets to private hands, welcomed foreign investment, allowed 
easy entry of new startups, reduced government regulations, and concentrated on 
improving the regulatory environment for private business.  
 
At the other extreme, Uzbekistan took a much more conservative approach. The 
government continues to direct investment and allocates a substantial share of the 
country’s economic resources. Foreign investment and foreign trade (beyond 
commodities) have grown slowly. Uzbek officials claim that the slow pace of reform 
softened the shock of transition and reduced the fall in output suffered by all transition   7
economies when they lost guaranteed markets and subsidies.
2 However, the failure to 
adopt market reforms and encourage competition has choked off growth during the 
recovery and led to lower productivity levels.
3  
 
The other Central Asian countries, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, appear to have an 
investment climate more like Uzbekistan’s than Poland’s, while Moldova’s investment 
climate appears to be somewhere in the middle. Managers in the Moldovan sample report 
higher levels of competition and better infrastructure than those in the Central Asian 
countries, but worse performance on these measures than in Poland.  
 
The transition economies inherited infrastructure of poorer quality than that in OECD 
countries, though of much better quality than that in most developing countries. All the 
transition economies had a well-educated workforce, with very high literacy. In the 2002 
Business Environment and Enterprise Productivity Survey managers in most of the 27 
transition economies included reported that the biggest constraints to private sector 
operations centered on governance issues, the regulatory regime and the uncertain policy 
environment.  
 
For managers in the smaller sample of transition economies used in this paper, 
macroeconomic uncertainty was the biggest concern, reflecting the transition experience 
                                                 
2 This information comes from interviews with Uzbek officials conducted as part of the World Bank’s 
recent investment climate assessment in Uzbekistan. 
3 Uzbekistan suffered a smaller decline in output than any other transition economy. Uzbek output at its 
lowest point, in 1995, was still 85 percent of the level in 1991. Several factors may have mitigated the 
decline in output. The country had a smaller industrial base to begin with, its main exports were 
commodities (such as gold and cotton) that were easy to reorient for export to the world market, and oil and 
energy production increased enough during this period to make Uzbekistan self-sufficient in these 
resources.    8
(figure 1). (While there were some differences among countries, the rank ordering was 
similar across countries, so only the sample averages are reported here.) As in almost 
every country where investment climate surveys have been conducted, managers also 
perceived both the cost and accessibility of finance as a problem. And while they 
perceived infrastructure, access to resources, and technology as important constraints, 
they considered them less so than the policy environment.  
 
 
Figure 1 Share of Firms Identifying Each Investment Climate Factor as a Major 
Constraint in Five Transition Economies 





Skills and education of available workers
Labor regulations
Legal system and conflict resolution
Crime, theft, and disorder
Business licensing and operating permits
Anticompetitive or informal practices
Customs and trade regulations
Corruption
Access to financing (such as collateral) 
Tax administration
Cost of financing (such as interest rates)
Tax rates
Regulatory policy uncertainty
Macroeconomic instability (inflation, exchange rate)
Percent
Note: Figure shows sample averages across the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Poland, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan. 




Measuring the Investment Climate 
Managers’ broad perceptions of the investment climate give some indication of the most 
constraining business problems. But to understand the effect of the investment climate on   9
firm performance requires specific measures of indicators. The investment climate survey 
collected data on a wide variety of quantitative as well as qualitative, or perception-
based, indicators of the investment climate. While perception based indicators are useful, 
they must be augmented by quantitative indicators to give an accurate picture of the 
investment climate.  
 
The reason is that managers have different frames of reference. An issue perceived as a 
major problem in one country may actually impose a smaller cost on businesses in that 
country than it does in a country where the problem is rated as merely moderate. So 
whenever possible it is important to gather quantitative measures of a problem (for 
example, how much companies pay in bribes on average) rather than just perceptions 
(how big a problem corruption is).  
 
There are a vast number of possible indicators and the challenge is to narrow this large 
selection down to a manageable number that accurately describe the investment climate. 
In doing so, researchers face two major problems: endogeneity and multicollinearity.  
 
This analysis treats the investment climate indicators as exogenous determinants of firms’ 
performance. However, high-performing firms may be proactive in reducing their own 
investment climate constraints, producing a simultaneity bias in the estimation exercise. 
For example, a well-managed, productive firm may be able to work with authorities to 
limit inspections or secure a more reliable power supply. To address this endogeneity 
issue, the empirical analysis uses average investment climate indicators taken across   10
firms in the same country, region, and sector. To the extent that individual firms are less 
likely to influence averages and provided that the sample cuts are sensibly chosen to 
reflect “pockets” of business environments, using averages is a valid way to instrument 
out the simultaneity problem.
4  
 
Among the possible investment climate indicators are multiple indicators that address a 
similar major issue, giving rise to multicollinearity. For example, many indicators relate 
to the quality of infrastructure—such as the prevalence of e-mail, the number of firms 
with their own power generators and the number of power outages in a given period. It is 
not clear how important any particular indicator is. The quality of infrastructure affects 
all firms, but which indicator matters most to a particular firm depends on its 
circumstances and its production technique. Typically, all of the indicators that address a 
broad dimension of the investment climate are highly correlated and move together. 
Consequently, it is not possible to know the importance of any one particular indicator 
since it may be serving as a proxy for other, more relevant variables.  
 
Investment climate is a vast concept, and a tension naturally arises between its breadth 
and a parsimonious quantitative approach. From a practical perspective this study is 
prevented from working with as many investment climate indicators as would be 
preferred, since correlation among them will eventually disrupt the econometric exercise. 
One solution used in past studies is to restrict the analysis to a subset of investment 
climate indicators and accept the omitted variable bias. Although this approach can yield 
                                                 
4 Another tradeoff that researchers face when deciding how many criteria on which to base the sample cut 
is that a thick cut will mitigate the endogeneity problem but generate little variation in the regressor, while 
a thin cut will have the opposite effect.    11
significant results, there are always questions of whether the IC variables used provide a 
representative description of the investment climate and whether the strength of the 
results is merely due to the particular selection of indicators. 
 
In an attempt to overcome both problems, this study reduces the dimensionality of the 
data by using principal component analysis.
5 The approach first identifies broad aspects 
of the investment climate measured by the survey, collects a few series that map into each 
of them, and then extracts the “main variation” commanded by each aspect through the 
use of their respective first principal component. It essentially treats all of the underlying 
investment climate indicators as proxies for three broad measures of the investment 
climate described below: “rent predation”, “infrastructure”, and “competition”. 
 
Rent predation 
The rent predation measure is constructed from survey responses on the costs imposed by 
bribery, bureaucracy, and inspections. Higher levels of predation typically have an 
adverse effect on performance.  
•  The cost of bribery—or the bribe tax—is the estimated amount of unofficial 
payments firms typically made to public officials in the previous year as a 
percentage of sales.  
•  The cost of bureaucracy—or the time tax—is the percentage of senior 
management time spent in dealing with public officials on the application and 
interpretation of laws and regulations and on getting or maintaining access to 
                                                 
5 See Manly (1994) for an intuitive introduction to principal component analysis and Mardia, Kent, and 
Bibby (1997) for a more technical exposition.    12
public services. The time tax is a proxy for how burdensome government red tape 
is.  
•  The cost of inspections is measured as the number of days in the previous year 
spent on inspections and required meetings with government officials. Higher 
numbers of inspections lower performance because more inspections provide 
more opportunities for rent seeking; it can generally be assumed that the more 
inspections there are, the more likely they are to be rent seeking activities.  
 
 













Inspections (days)  32.1  21.7  16.8  12.9  15.2 
Bribe tax (percent)  2.1  1.2  0.4  1.6  0.5 
Time tax (percent)  8.3  3.1  9.4  2.4  8.3 
Note: See text for definitions of indicators. 
Source: World Bank, Business Environment and Enterprise Productivity Extension Survey, 2003. 
 
The Kyrgyz Republic appears to perform the worst on the rent predation measure, with 
the highest values for inspections and the bribe tax (table 1). Poland has the lowest bribe 
tax but the highest time tax. Still, it is difficult to say that any one country suffers from 
the highest level of rent predation. It has been suggested that there may be large 
measurement error because in some countries managers are unwilling to talk about 
government rent seeking. However, the interview teams provided no evidence of 
systematic measurement error.  
 
Infrastructure  
The infrastructure measure indicates the effect of inadequate infrastructure on firm 
performance. A composite measure of the average number of days firms experienced   13
interruptions in power, water, and telephone service in the last year, it serves as a proxy 
for the overall state of infrastructure.  
 
The European countries clearly have a superior infrastructure, with Poland’s stronger 
than Moldova’s (table 2). Firms in Poland, on average, experienced only 1.5 power 
outages during the previous year and those in Moldova 2.3—compared with 37.3 in 
Tajikistan and 15.8 in the Kyrgyz Republic. Water and telephone outages tell a similar 
story. Firms in Uzbekistan reported fewer service outages on average than those in the 
other Central Asian countries, but still substantially more than those in the European 
countries.  
 
These microeconomic results mirror country-level data. For example, the European 
countries had the most telephone mainlines per 1,000 people and the most Internet hosts 
per 10,000 people in 2000, with Poland having the most developed telecommunications 
sector. 
 













Service interruptions in 
previous year 
         
Power  15.8  2.3  1.5  37.3  7.7 
Water  2.4  1.0  0.2  1.8  2.0 
Telephone  1.9  4.3  0.5  6.4  1.8 
           























Source: For service interruptions, World Bank, Business Environment and Enterprise Productivity 
Extension Survey, 2003; for other data, World Bank, World Development Indicators database. 
 
 
Competition    14
Competitive pressure is the driving force behind productivity improvements. In closed 
economies with sheltered markets enterprises have little incentive to invest in new 
products or cost saving measures. But in open, highly competitive economies enterprises 
must constantly strive to improve their competitive position to survive. The competition 
measure uses a series of perception questions regarding the importance of domestic and 
foreign competition for decisions to introduce new products and to reduce the costs of 
existing products. It also includes a question on the number of competitors in firms’ main 
product line as a gauge of market power. 
 
 













Importance of domestic 
competition for decisions
a 
         
To introduce new products  2.7  2.6  3.3  2.7  2.4 
To reduce costs  3.0  2.9  3.3  2.6  2.1 
Importance of foreign 
competition for decisions
a 
         
To introduce new products  2.4  2.2  2.9  2.0  1.8 
To reduce costs  2.4  2.5  2.9  2.0  1.7 
           












Average net inflows of foreign 
direct investment (percentage 
















a. Average ranking by firms on a scale of 1 (not at all important) to 4 (very important). 
Source: For foreign direct investment, World Bank, World Development Indicators database; for all other 
data, World Bank, Business Environment and Enterprise Productivity Extension Survey, 2003. 
 
By all measures based on managers’ perceptions, Poland has a much more competitive 
economy than the Central Asian countries or even Moldova (table the 3). On average 
Polish managers ranked pressure from domestic competitors as 3.3 in importance (with 3 
meaning fairly important and 4 very important), while in other countries average rankings 
ranged between 2.14 and 3.0. As expected, the lowest scores appeared in Uzbekistan,   15
where government policies have restricted competition. By contrast, Poland has taken a 
number of steps to liberalize and open its economy to competition, many in preparation 
for joining the European Union. Poland has privatized all but some of its older, heavy 
industries (such as mining and shipbuilding), and many new businesses have entered the 
market since transition began.  
 
The rate of foreign direct investment is one way to illustrate the relative openness of the 
European economies in the sample. In 1996–2001 net inflows of foreign direct 
investment averaged 5.1 percent of GDP in Poland and 4.0 percent in Moldova, but only 
1.9 percent in Tajikistan and 0.8 percent in Uzbekistan.  
 
 
Principal Components and the Underlying Investment Climate Variables 
Principal component analysis is used to pin down weights for a linear combination of the 
underlying investment climate variables such that the resulting series (the first principal 
component) has maximum variance. Intuitively, the goal is to construct one artificial 
series that can summarize the behavior of a group of underlying variables that describe 
similar aspects of the investment climate. Only the first principal components are used 
because having a single series for each dimension of the investment climate will be 
crucial when the analysis attempts to rank the dimensions by their relative ability to 
“explain” the variation in firm-level productivity.
6 
                                                 
6 The analysis is restricted to the first principal components because they adequately characterize the broad 
dimensions of investment climate yet yield a parsimonious list of variables that explain the effect of the 
investment climate on firm performance. The eigenvalues associated with each of the first principal 
components are greater than one, while those associated with each of the second principal components are   16
 
Since the first principal components are used to summarize different dimensions of the 
business environment, they can be expected to be correlated with the underlying 
(individual) investment climate variables. Indeed, the first principal components are 
strongly associated with their corresponding investment climate variables (averaged for 
each country-region-sector slice; table 4). 
 
Table 4 Correlation between Investment Climate Variables and First Principal 
Components 





















Time tax  0.8114  Telephone  0.7297  Domestic, 
reduce costs 
0.8709 




        Num. of 
Competitors 
0.4639 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Estimating Productivity 
Firm-level productivity estimates are generated for the sample by fitting a Cobb-Douglas 
production function after pooling across sectors and countries. Equation 1 gives a general 
form of the production function:  
d b a M L AK Q=
      (1)  
Here A is a term that captures the influence of the investment climate on the production 
function. It is in effect the residual portion of output not accounted for by inputs of 
                                                                                                                                                 
either only slightly greater or less than one. This fact gives some assurance that relying only on the first 
principal component does not involve throwing away “too much” information.   17
capital (K), labor (L), and raw materials and fuel (M) and can be ascribed to the business 
climate. It is modeled here as a function of observable investment climate indicators, x. 
Taking logs, the equation for this general form can be written as: 
) (     (2) i i i i x m l k q f d b a = - - -  
The left side of this equation is conventionally known as total factor productivity (TFP), 
and in the model used here it is a function of the investment climate.  
 
The concept of investment climate has an important country-specific component, and as a 
result, including country dummy variables in a regression may wash away much of the 
effects of the investment climate indicators. But it is important to take into account 
country-specific effects when estimating coefficients on capital and labor. The analysis 
thus proceeds in two steps. First the basic production function is estimated with country 
dummies but without investment climate measures. Then, using the coefficients from this 
regression, TFP is calculated and regressed on broad investment climate measures.  
 
The production function is estimated in logs. In addition, it is assumed that firms in the 
sample are price takers and that they purchase capital and raw materials at world prices. 
Thus, the dollar value of capital and materials and the dollar value of output can be 
compared across countries. These are strong assumptions, but given the highly 
competitive nature of the selected sectors they are not unreasonable. Wage rates diverge 
across countries so that labor input is measured by the number of workers, not the value 
of labor used. The regressors include inputs (material, labor, and capital), capacity 
utilization, schooling, sectoral and country dummy variables. The basic model is   18
augmented with capacity utilization to account for efficiency loss due to unused capacity 
and low market demand.
7 The schooling variable is a weighted average of education 
years of the workforce and captures elements of labor quality.
8 Nominal values are 
converted to U.S. dollars using nominal exchange rates.
9 The regression is estimated 
using ordinary least squares with White correction for heteroskedasticity and allows for 
clustering within countries. The specification is as follows:  
i
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The different production technologies used by the two sectors could mean a need to 
estimate separate equations for each sector. In an unreported exercise the equation is 
therefore estimated with sectoral dummy variables interacted with the input coefficients. 
The parameter estimates are not jointly significant, however. Consequently, the data are 
pooled across sectors to take advantage of a large sample size and the results of the 
production function estimation are reported in Table 5.  
 
Moldova is chosen as the base country, and country-specific productivity gaps expressed 
in relative percentage terms are retrieved from the estimated coefficients on the country 
                                                 
7 Capacity utilization was estimated by simply asking managers what they considered their capacity 
utilization to be. No effort was made to define a standard number of shifts or correct for differences in the 
length of the workweek.  
8 There was no reliable information on worker training or experience in the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Productivity Extension Survey.  
9 Using nominal rather than real exchange rates  introduces bias because many countries intervene to 
support the value of their currency. Uzbekistan in particular has an overvalued exchange rate. But in 
comparisons of international competitiveness nominal exchange rates make more sense because these are 
what exporters face.   19
dummy variables.
10 The results show large productivity gaps between countries (figure 
2). Although the sample is drawn from enterprises in the same industries and using 
similar technologies, productivity is higher for enterprises in countries with a more 
competitive and less costly investment climate. Firms in Poland are 28 percent more 
efficient than those in Moldova, while firms in Uzbekistan, the least efficient, are 26 
percent less efficient than those in Moldova.  












Poland Tajikistan Uzbekistan Kyrgyz Republic
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
In the second step the coefficients estimated in equation 3 are used to derive the measure 
of firm-level productivity:  
) ( ln ˆ ) ( ln ˆ        
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i s i u
i c i l i m i i
Schooling CapUtil




- - - - =
 
 
 Table 5 Production Function Results 
Ln (Output)   Coefficient  Standard error 
                                                 
10 Productivity gap for country n = [ exp ( n b ) – 1 ] * 100, for any country n other than Moldova.  
   20
Ln (Material)  0.72*  0.0167 
Ln (Labor)  0.22*  0.0172 
Ln (Capital)  0.07*  0.0150 
Ln (CapUtil)  0.08**   0.0339 
Ln (Schooling)  0.40**  0.1456 
Dummy Food  –0.005  0.0469 
Poland  0.25*  0.0348 
Tajikistan   –0.15*  0.0142 
Uzbekistan  –0.30*  0.0163 
Kyrgyz Republic  –0.29*  0.0291 
* Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
 
Country dummies are intentionally not included in the second equation (since, as noted, 
including them  washes away much of the effect of the investment climate variables). 
Their role in the analysis is simply to allow for cleaner estimates of input elasticities and 
coefficients on capacity utilization and schooling in the first regression.  
 
The measure of performance (log-TFP) is regressed against control variables including 
age, percentage of sales exported, percentage of foreign ownership, and the first principal 
components of each of the three broad dimensions of investment climate—rent predation, 
infrastructure, and competition. The level of exports is included because it is often argued 
that exporting is a learning mechanism, which enables companies to improve productivity 
by learning from customers and facing international competition. Likewise, foreign 
ownership may increase productivity if foreign investors bring new technologies and 
management techniques.  
 
The analysis uses ordinary least squares with White correction for heteroskedasticity and 
allows for clustering within countries. The specification is as follows:    21
i b b
i i i i
n Competitio ture Infrastruc
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e b b
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6 5
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The rent predation and infrastructure variables are constructed in a such way that higher 
values denote worse conditions, while the opposite is true for the competition variable. 
The results confirm the expected signs of the investment climate variables and clearly 
indicate that investment climate (understood as the joint significance of the investment 
climate regressors) matters for firm performance (table 6).
11  
Table 6 Total Factor Productivity Regression Results 
 
Regressor 
Coefficient  Standard 
error 
Age  0.0004131  0.0022152 
Foreign ownership  0.0012388  0.0009047 
Exports (percentage of sales)  0.00038  0.0009567 
Rent Predation   –0.1515815*  0.0315022 
Infrastructure  –0.1475655*  0.0312063 
Competition  0.1215699*  0.0038598 
Constant  –0.7475619*  0.0449609 
 * Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Note: R2 is 0.44. Using the Wald test, the null hypothesis that coefficients 
 on investment climate regressors are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the  
1 percent level.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
What Matters Most? Competition 
The preceding analysis clearly demonstrates the importance of competition, rent 
predation, and infrastructure in determining firm-level productivity. However, for the 
analysis to be useful requires another step—identifying the relative importance of these 
dimensions of the investment climate and thus the areas of reform that will generate the 
largest payoff. Because the investment climate dimensions are principal components, 
                                                 
11 Unreported results from a specification that directly includes a number of investment climate indicators 
indicate that foreign ownership and exporting behavior are significant. But when the principal component 
approach, which better captures the overall investment climate, is used, these two variables no longer 
appear to be significant. 
   22
their coefficients do not have a scale that can be easily interpreted (Greene 2000, p. 258). 
Moreover, because many of the indicators that comprise the investment climate 
dimensions are qualitative, it is unclear how to construe changes in them.  
 
To guide policy, we need to be able to rank the relative importance of each of the 
investment climate dimensions in explaining the variation in productivity across firms. 
However, there is no easy way of assessing relative performance of regressors in a 
multiple regression context when, as is certainly the case here, they are not completely 
independent. One way is to take a fraction-of-variance approach, but this requires a 
natural ordering of the regressors, something not present in this case. Another possible 




Kruskal’s approach builds on the simple concept of partial correlation coefficients, which 
can be used whenever it is necessary to measure the association between two variables 
after accounting for the common influence of other factors. A one-dimensional index 
capturing the relative explanatory power of each investment climate regressor is 
calculated by averaging over a sequence of squared partial correlation coefficients 
generated from all possible orderings in which such regressors can be considered (see 
appendix 2 for details on the procedure used).  
 
The normalized index scores indicate that competition accounts for far more variation in 
firm-level productivity than infrastructure and rent predation (figure 3). The competition 
                                                 
12 See also Johnston and DiNardo (1997) for an exposition of Kruskal’s methodology.    23
measure explains more than 3.7 times as much variation as the rent predation measure. 
Next in importance is infrastructure, which explains 1.73 times as much variation as rent 
predation, though less than half as much as competition. 
Figure 3 










Rent predation Infrastructure Competition
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper not only provides strong evidence of the link between the investment climate 
and firm-level productivity but also demonstrates an approach for ranking different  
dimensions of the investment climate. The results indicate that competitive pressure is the 
most important factor driving productivity levels. A good supporting infrastructure and a 
nonpredatory regulatory environment are invaluable, but they are not sufficient. It is 
pressure from market competition that drives firms to improve efficiency. Open 
economies that foster such pressure will see faster growth and greater poverty alleviation.    24
 
This finding suggests that the relatively quick steps governments can take to increase 
competition will have a big payoff in firm performance—even as the slow, expensive 
process of upgrading infrastructure takes place. It also indicates that high levels of fixed 
investment, especially in infrastructure, will not be enough to spur growth. Uzbekistan, 
for example, has had relatively high levels of fixed investment but low productivity 
growth, suggesting that the investment expenditures have not been particularly efficient. 
Investment must be accompanied by liberalization, which allows market competition to 
ensure that resources are efficiently allocated.    25
Appendix 1 Summary Statistics 
 
Table A1.1 Firm Characteristics, Full Sample 
Characteristic  Observations 
Firm size (employees)   
0–49  257 
50–99  38 
100–249  36 
250 +  31 
Ownership   
Domestic  334 
Some foreign   28 
Exports (percentage of sales)   
None  298 
0–9  5 
10–49  21 
50–99   30 
100  8 
 
Table A1.2 Country Descriptive Statistics 











  Foreign ownership (percent)  66  3.8  0 
  Exports (percentage of sales)  66  11.5  0 
  Sales (thousands of U.S. dollars)  66  169.9  34.9 
         
Moldova  Firm size (employees)  86  107.3  30 
  Foreign ownership (percent)  86  4.5  0 
  Exports (percentage of sales)  86  23.5  0 
  Sales (thousands of U.S. dollars)  86  445.2  139.6 
         
Poland  Firm size (employees)  67  64.4  20 
  Foreign ownership (percent)  67  1.5  0 
  Exports (percentage of sales)  67  8.0  0 
  Sales (thousands of U.S. dollars)  67  2,070.7  490.2 
         
Tajikistan  Firm size (employees)  61  19.2  7 
  Foreign ownership (percent)  61  0  0 
  Exports (percentage of sales)  61  0.3  0 
  Sales (thousands of U.S. dollars)  61  32.0  12.9 
         
Uzbekistan  Firm size (employees)  82  112.1  21.5 
  Foreign ownership (percent)  82  13  0 
  Exports (percentage of sales)  82  1.6  0 
  Sales (thousands of U.S. dollars)  82  372.5  42.3 
         
Total  Firm size (employees)  362  85.2  20 
  Foreign ownership (percent)  362  5.0  0 
  Exports (percentage of sales)  362  9.6  0 
  Sales (thousands of U.S. dollars)  362  609.8  69.9   26
Appendix 2 Kruskal Methodology 
There is no clear way to determine the relative importance of individual regressors in a 
multiple regression when there is no natural ordering to the regressors. However, Kruskal 
(1987) proposes an intuitive and practical solution, derived from basic statistical 
concepts, that attempts to deal with the ambiguity produced by the correlation structure of 
the explanatory variables. The procedure as implemented in this paper is as follows.  
 
For each one of the three broad investment climate dimensions—rent predation, 
infrastructure, and competition—the analysis calculates the four different partial 
correlation coefficients arising from all permutations in which a particular dimension can 
be considered after holding all controls (age, exports, and foreign ownership) fixed. To 
further illustrate the procedure, let’s consider rent predation. The goal is to study how 
much variation in firm-level productivity this dimension can account for after the effect 
of some firm characteristics is removed.  
 
Because rent predation is likely to be correlated with the other two dimensions 
(infrastructure and competition), ambiguity arises when trying to determine how much 
variation each dimension commands. It is impossible to know whether the correlation 
between log-TFP and rent predation should be measured after or before removing the 
common influence of infrastructure, competition, or even both. That leaves four possible 
measures of correlation.  
Ordering 1: Partial correlation coefficient between log-TFP and  Rent Predation holding 
firm controls fixed.   27
 
Ordering 2: Partial correlation coefficient between log-TFP and Rent Predation holding 
firm controls and  Infrastructure fixed. 
  
Ordering 3: Partial correlation coefficient between log-TFP and  Rent Predation holding 
firm controls and  Competition fixed.  
 
Ordering 4: Partial correlation coefficient between log-TFP and IC Rent Predation 
holding firm controls, IC Infrastructure, and IC Competition fixed. 
 
There is no reason to believe that one ordering is better than any other, since there is no 
particular order in which the different investment climate dimensions impact firm 
performance. So a strategy is needed to deal with the information contained in such a 
sequence of partial correlation coefficients. A natural and intuitive approach would be to 
plot the four partial correlation coefficients associated with each one of the three 
dimensions studied. This would provide a visual representation of how log-TFP and 
different investment climate dimensions are correlated when different variables are held 
fixed. To do so, the following notation is used (figure A2.1):  
•  Let P1 denote the partial correlation coefficient between firm performance (P) 
and investment climate dimension 1, holding firm controls fixed.  
•  Let P1.2 denote the partial correlation coefficient between firm performance (P) 
and investment climate dimension 1, holding firm controls and investment climate 
dimension 2 fixed.    28
•  Let P1.23 denote the partial correlation coefficient between firm performance (P) 
and investment climate dimension 1, holding firm controls, investment climate 
dimension 2, and investment climate dimension 3 fixed.  
 
Figure A2.1 





















P1       P2        P3 P1.2     P2.1     P3.1 P1.3     P2.3     P3.2 P1.23   P2.13   P3.12


















































1 - Rent Predation 2 -Infrastrucutre 3 - Competition  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The figure illustrates the perils of looking at partial correlation coefficients without 
considering alternative orderings in which left-out variables are held fixed. The figures 
for each investment climate dimension fluctuate as the influence of the other two 
dimensions is added or removed. More important, the visual representation still seems 
convoluted and unable to deliver a clear message about which dimension matters the 
most. If the explanatory power of competition is measured by P3 and the explanatory   29
power of infrastructure by P2.13, infrastructure would appear to be more powerful—but 
if P2 is used rather than P2.13, the opposite would be the case. 
 
To address this issue, Kruskal proposes a way of summarizing the information in the 
figure. The method involves transforming each set  of four partial correlation coefficients 
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It is now possible to provide a ranking of investment climate dimensions by their ability 
to account for the observed variation in firm-level productivity. Moreover, after 
normalizing the Kruskal scores, it is also possible to provide a quantitative estimate of 
how much more variation the leading dimension can account for compared with the 
others (table A2.1).  
Table A2.1 Kruskal Scores of Explained Variation 
 
Investment climate dimension 
Average of squared partial 
correlation coefficients 
Normalized score (with rent 
predation as the base) 
Rent predation  0.072201  1 
Infrastructure  0.125271  1.735038 
Competition   0.267092  3.699295 
Source: Authors’ calculations.   30
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